Air Force Sought to Calculate Where a Missile Might Fall After a Malfunction
Researchers studied rare malfunctions and simulated where a launch vehicle might land.
Researchers studied rare malfunctions and simulated where a launch vehicle might land.
Researchers used launch records and simulated malfunctions to estimate where a missile might impact after a failure. They adjusted two values in their calculations based on the simulated impacts.
RTI Report No. RTI/5180/77-43F, dated 10 September 1996, titled 'Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations,' a 180-page final technical report prepared by Research Triangle Institute (with subcontractor ACTA, Inc.) for the U.S. Air Force 45th Space Wing (Patrick AFB) and 30th Space Wing (Vandenberg AFB) under Contract F04703-91-C-0112. The report describes how 'Mode-5' failure responses (vehicle deviations far uprange or off the flight line) are modeled in RTI's launch-area risk-analysis program DAMP, derives shaping constants A and B for the Mode-5 impact-density function for Atlas IIAS, Delta-GEM, Titan IV and LLV1, and computes overall failure probabilities (Atlas 0.022, Delta 0.010, Titan 0.040 in flight phase 0-1). Appendix D contains a complete launch-by-launch performance and failure-narrative history of Atlas, Delta, Titan, and Thor space-launch vehicles from each program's beginning through August 1996. The document contains no UAP/UFO content; it is an engineering report on space-booster reliability and range safety, included in the war.gov UAP archive likely because it pertains to range-fouling/anomalous-trajectory phenomena.
Prospector (Joust) launch — illustrative Mode-5 failure. 'The vehicle made a radical pitch-up maneuver due to aft-skirt structural failure at approximately T+14 Seconds.' Vacuum instantaneous impact trace shown in Figure 1.
A guided Red Tigress sounding rocket made a near 90-degree right turn within a second or two of clearing the launcher and flew stably in that direction until destroyed by the safety officer at 23.3 seconds.
Atlas 8E (flight 76): Missile stability lost at ~161 sec, ~30 sec after BECO, probably due to failure of the servo-amplifier power supply. Sustainer engine shut down at 248 sec; verniers ~10 sec later. Classified as Mode-5 response.
Titan M-4: A one-bit error in the W velocity accumulation caused impact 86 miles short and 14 miles right of target.
Atlas 145D (Mariner R-1): Booster phase normal until guidance enable at ~157 sec. Guidance rate beacon operation intermittent; faulty guidance equations gave erroneous commands. Vehicle deviations from 172 sec, max yaw deviation 60 deg and pitch deviation 28 deg at 270 sec; vehicle 'deviated grossly from the planned trajectory in azimuth and velocity, and executed abnormal maneuvers in pitch and yaw.'
Atlas SLV-3 (GTA-9): Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 sec. Loss of pitch control resulted in pitch-down maneuver greater than 90 deg. Guidance control lost at 132 sec; after BECO vehicle stabilized in an 'abnormal attitude.'
Atlas 95F: Telemetered roll/yaw rates indicated erratic behavior immediately after liftoff. Yawed hard left in first 10 sec, then hard right, crossed flight line toward right destruct line, then pitched up violently with IP moving back toward beach.
Delta Intelsat III: Loss of rate gyro caused undamped pitch oscillations from 20 sec; 'a series of violent maneuvers' from 59 sec — vehicle pitched down ~270 deg, then up 210 deg, then large yaw left during a 13-sec interval. Regained control at 72 sec; first stage broke up at 103 sec; second stage destroyed by RSO at 110.6 sec.
Delta Pioneer E: First-stage hydraulics system failed seconds before MECO. Vehicle pitched down, yawed left, rolled counterclockwise driving all gyros off limits, then tumbled. Second-stage separation/ignition occurred while out of control; second stage regained control after ~20 sec in yaw-right, pitch-up attitude.
Atlas 68E: Lube oil pressure on B2 booster engine dropped at 102.7 sec. B2 shut down at 120.1 sec; B1 guidance shutdown 385 ms later. Asymmetric thrust caused yaw/roll the FCS could not correct; thrusting sustainer pivoted missile to a 'retrofire attitude' before stabilization. Sustainer continued thrusting in retrofire mode until 282.9 sec.
Titan 34D (AFSC): At T+~8.8 sec the insulation and case of SRM No. 2 debonded resulting in case rupture. Core vehicle destroyed by fragments; Auto-destruct activated on SRM-1 at 9.0 sec.
Titan 34D (AFSC): Stage-1 engine experienced three major anomalies (S/A-2 oxidizer leak of 165 lb/sec at 110 sec, S/A-1 internal fuel leak of 30 lb/sec at 213 sec creating side force, S/A-1 turbopump shutdown at 213 sec). Erratic attitude rates noted at 221 sec; impact point stopped at 229 sec; stages separated as stage 2 ignited at 257 sec.
Titan IV: Leak in SRM #1 at 99.9 sec rapidly enveloped vehicle in propellant gases; ~1.6 sec later vehicle blew up and disintegrated, apparently due to activation of inadvertent-separation destruct system. Destruct transmitted at 104.5 sec.
Titan II/SLV (Landsat 6): After successful Titan-II second-stage burn and payload separation, the apogee-kick motor failed to ignite and circularize the highly-elliptical orbit.
Commercial Titan: Wiring team miswired the harness connecting the missile guidance computer payload-separation discretes to the payload separation device, so satellite never received separation signal. PKM and satellite did not separate from Stage II.
Thor 311 (Composite I): Probably due to rupture of lower oxidizer manifold, normal thrust levels never developed at second-stage ignition. About 50 ms after ignition, severe thrust chamber motion developed and second stage began to tumble. First tumble period ~29 sec. Classified as Mode-5.
"Missile and space-vehicle performance histories contain many examples of failures that cause, or have the potential to cause, significant vehicle deviations from the intended flight line. In RTI's risk-analysis program, DAMP, such failures are referred to as Mode-5 failure responses."
Why it matters: Defines the report's central concept of Mode-5 failure responses (off-flight-line debris).
Page 4
"Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors to protect administrative/operational use data, 10 September 96."
Why it matters: Original distribution restriction (now released via the war.gov UAP portal in 2026).
Page 1
"Outside the launch area, any malfunction with the potential to cause a substantial deviation from the intended flight direction is classified as a Mode-5 failure response."
Why it matters: Defines Mode-5 — the category that captures all 'unlikely' uprange/cross-range trajectory deviations.
Page 88
"Many other Mode-5 responses are so convoluted that they defy description or categorization."
Why it matters: Acknowledges that some launch-vehicle failure behaviors cannot be cleanly described — possibly the only point in the document tangentially relevant to a UAP-archive context.
Page 17
"The vehicle made a radical pitch-up maneuver due to aft-skirt structural failure at approximately T+14 Seconds."
Speaker: Eastern Test Range Directorate of Safety Post-Test Report, Test D1000 (cited)
Why it matters: Specific quoted description of the Joust/Prospector Mode-5 example.
Page 15
James A. Ward, Jr.
Co-author (RTI) · Research Triangle Institute · Page 2
Robert M. Montgomery
Co-author (RTI) · Research Triangle Institute · Page 2
Martin Kinna
30 SW/SEY technical monitor · 30th Space Wing Safety Office (AFSPC) · Page 3
Louis J. Ullian, Jr.
45 SW/SED technical monitor · 45th Space Wing Safety Office (AFSPC) · Page 3
Kevin Silke
Author of cited 'Reliability Growth Model Overview' (Reliability Bulletin 92-02) · General Dynamics · Page 180
Steven J. Isakowitz
Author of cited International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems · AIAA · Page 180
Jeff Samella
Updater of cited reference · Page 180
O. G. Smith
Author of cited 'Launch Systems for Manned Spacecraft' draft · Page 180
C. W. Fenske
Author of cited 'Atlas Flight Program Summary' · Lockheed Martin · Page 181
Bob Brater
Source of cited 'Launch History' fax to RTI · Lockheed Martin · Page 181
Andrew H. Quintero
Author of cited Aerospace memo on Eastern Range launch failures · Aerospace Corporation · Page 181
Bill Zelinsky
Provider of Quintero memo to RTI · Page 181
I-Shih Chang
Author of cited 'Space Launch Vehicle Failures (1984-1995)' (TOR-96(8504)-2) · Aerospace Corporation · Page 181
James Baeker
Provider of Vandenberg Missile Launch Operations Logs · ACTA, Inc. · Page 180
Black-bar/redaction-style artifact in the contract number on the title page ('Contract No.■-FO4703-91-C-0112'), although the full contract number 'F04703-91-C-0112' is given in clear on the next page.
Likely reason: Likely scan artifact rather than a true redaction; the same number is unredacted on page 2 and on the SF 298 (page 3).
Document is a 181-page Air Force / RTI engineering risk-analysis report on launch-vehicle failure modeling and a comprehensive Atlas/Delta/Titan/Thor launch-failure history through August 1996. Despite its inclusion in the war.gov UAP archive, it contains NO UAP/UFO observation content; the relevance is presumably to range-safety / 'range fouler' / unexplained-trajectory framing. Meta: 181 pages, 387,563 chars, OCR ratio 0.0 (all pages had embedded text via PyMuPDF), so OCR noise is low but layout/columnar tables produced fragmented text. The 'incidents' captured are the engineering failure cases the report itself cites as Mode-5 illustrations (Section 2 and the Joust/Red Tigress examples on pp. 15) plus a representative selection from the Atlas/Delta/Titan/Thor failure narratives in Appendix D — Appendix D contains hundreds of additional flight-by-flight entries that have not been individually enumerated here. Confidence 0.78 reflects: (a) full-text read of front matter, summary, examples, and references; (b) sampling of the long appendix table/narrative pages; (c) OCR fragmentation of tabular data which makes per-row capture noisy. The 'anomalies' field is intentionally empty — the report uses 'anomalous behavior' in a strict engineering sense (off-nominal launch-vehicle behavior with identified or suspected mechanical/electrical causes), none of which the document itself flags as genuinely unexplained in a UAP sense.
No. It describes a method for risk calculation, not a specific launch that ended in deviation.
They determined the rate at which the impact estimate diminished as the impact moved farther away and as the missile deviated more from its trajectory.
Patrick AFB, United States
Page 1
Vandenberg AFB, United States
Page 1
Cape Canaveral Air Station, United States
Page 88
Eastern Range (ER), United States
Page 6
Western Range (WR), United States
Page 6
Cocoa Beach, Florida, United States
Page 1
Torrance, California (ACTA Skypark 3), United States
Page 3
Pad 20, Cape Canaveral, United States
Page 15
Complex 36 (Atlas IIAS launch site), United States
Page 86
Cuba (debris impact area for Transit 3A)
Page 179
45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (45 SW/SE)
U.S. Air Force · Page 1
30th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (30 SW/SE)
U.S. Air Force · Page 1
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
U.S. Air Force · Page 1
Air Force Space Command Launch Services Office
U.S. Air Force · Page 180
Eastern Test Range Directorate of Safety
U.S. Air Force · Page 180
45th Space Wing History Office
U.S. Air Force · Page 180
30th Space Wing Office of History
U.S. Air Force · Page 180
45th Space Wing Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO)
U.S. Air Force · Page 180
Atlas (A, B, C, D, E, F, LV-3A, LV-3B, LV-3C, SLV-3, SLV-3A, SLV-3C, SLV-3D, G, H, I, II, IIA, IIAS)
spacecraft · Page 110
Delta (291X, 391X, 392X, 492X, 592X, 692X, 792X, Delta-GEM)
spacecraft · Page 109
Titan (IIIB, IIIC, IIID, IIIE, 34B, 34D, III/CT, IV, II-SLV)
spacecraft · Page 109
Thor and Thor-boosted launchers (Able, Able-Star, etc.)
spacecraft · Page 173
LLV1 (Lockheed Launch Vehicle 1)
spacecraft · Page 79
Centaur upper stage (D, D-1A, D-1T)
spacecraft · Page 110
Agena upper stage (A, B, D)
spacecraft · Page 110
Castor IVA solid-rocket motors (strap-on SRMs)
spacecraft · Page 110
RL-10 engine (Centaur)
spacecraft · Page 110
Joust / Prospector (single-stage Castor IV-A)
spacecraft · Page 15
Red Tigress sounding rocket
spacecraft · Page 15
DAMP (facility DAMage and Personnel injury) risk-analysis program
ground · Page 10
What happens if a malfunction sends a launch vehicle far off course? In a report prepared for the US Air Force, researchers attempted to calculate where it might land.
Most malfunctions lead to impacts close to the flight path. However, rare failures can cause a missile to deviate significantly. Without including this possibility, risk assessment is incomplete.
A launch vehicle is the rocket that carries a spacecraft or payload into space. The researchers examined records of Atlas, Delta, and Titan launches, collecting data on malfunctions and how the missiles behaved when things went wrong.
In a 1996 report, they explored how to estimate potential impacts resulting from such failures. They didn't limit themselves to cases where the missile impacts near the planned trajectory. The goal was to also include rare malfunctions that could send it much farther afield.
The researchers simulated specific malfunctions and examined where the missile might impact as a result of each. This yielded possible impact locations, rather than just a single point.
To align the calculation with the simulated results, they repeatedly adjusted two values. These values determined the rate at which the impact estimate diminished as the impact moved farther away and as the missile deviated more to the side of its trajectory. The researchers fine-tuned them until the simulated results and the calculation roughly matched.
This created a method to describe the possible dispersion of impacts, rather than assuming every malfunction would end near the flight path. The outcome was intended to assist in risk assessment, not to predict where a specific rocket would fall.
The report does not describe a specific launch that ended in deviation, nor does it specify a particular distance a missile might drift. It presents a method for risk calculation, alongside records of previous malfunctions.
On a map, the planned trajectory is a single line. The researchers also tried to calculate the area outside of it.