During a mission over the Gulf of Aden, a crew member spotted an object flying straight and at a steady altitude. He tracked it until it was too far away.
A military crew member spotted an object flying straight over the Gulf of Aden and tracked it until it was too far away. The report says it was faster than the aircraft, but gives no speeds or identification.
USCENTCOM MISREP 10194673 (SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY) documenting an ISR sortie on 14 July 2024 in support of NAVCENT and AFCENT, originated by the 124 ATKS, 132 Wing. During the first ISR tasking the redacted aircraft observed 1x UAP at 140517ZJUL24, which traveled in a straight flight path at the same altitude, was assessed benign, and was followed northwest until the distance became too far to track. The report was approved for release to AARO under USCENTCOM MDR 25-0072 on 2 June 2025, with extensive 1.4a/1.4g redactions throughout (tail number, callsign, asset/MDS type, sensors, speeds, altitudes).
Single UAP observed during ISR target development in support of NAVCENT (Operation [redacted]). UAP traveled on a straight flight path at the same altitude on a NW trajectory; the friendly aircraft followed the UAP until the distance became too far to follow. Assessed benign by the observer. Primary sensor was FMV; observation/interrogation was 'NO'. No engagement, no recovery, no effects on persons or equipment.
"OBSERVED 1X UAP AT 140517ZJUL24 IVO 38P MT 53 1.4a 17 1.4a (SEE UAP 1)."
Why it matters: Primary GENTEXT/ISR notation of the UAP observation during NAVCENT-supporting ISR.
Page 5
"UAP Maneuverability Observations: STRAIGHT FLIGHT PATH AT SAME ALTI"
Why it matters: Reporter's characterization of UAP kinematics.
Page 7
"UAP'S SPEED WAS FASTER THAN THE 1.4a, 1.4g FLYING SPEED"
Speaker: Observer (TSGT/E-5)
Why it matters: Anomalous-characteristics field; UAP outpaced the friendly aircraft (specific platform/speed redacted).
Page 8
"FOLLOWED THE UAP TILL THE DISTANCE BECAME TOO FAR TO FOLLOW"
Why it matters: Outcome of the pursuit; friendly aircraft could not maintain contact.
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"Observer Assessment of UAP: Benign"
Why it matters: Operator assessment despite UAP outrunning friendly aircraft.
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"UAP Propulsion Means: UNKNOWN"
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"UAP Under Intelligent Control (yes/no; if yes, describe): UNKNOWN"
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"UAP Advanced Capabilities And/Or Materials (yes/no; if yes, describe): UNKNOWN ABOUT ADVANCED CAPABILITIES AND/OR MATERIALS"
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"Kinetic Trajectory: NW"
MG Brandon R. Tegtmeier
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff (release recommender) · USCENTCOM · Page 1
Gulf of Aden
Page 1
38P MT 51 (tasked start point, ISR 1)
Page 5
38P MT 53 (UAP first coordinate)
Page 7
38P MT 22 (UAP last coordinate)
Page 8
38P MT 64 (friendly aircraft location at observation)
Page 7
38P MV 24 (tasked start point, ISR 2)
Page 6
124 ATKS
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
132 Wing
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
432 AEW
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
379 AEW
U.S. Air Force · Page 3
609th Air Operations Center / 609 CAOC
U.S. Air Force · Page 1
ACC (Air Combat Command)
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
NAVCENT
U.S. Navy (USCENTCOM) · Page 1
AFCENT
U.S. Air Force (USCENTCOM) · Page 1
Tail number, takeoff location, sensor used, mission times, mission hours, IMINT hours, callsign, asset type all marked '1.4a'
Likely reason: E.O. 13526 §1.4(a) — military plans, weapons systems, or operations
Operation name marked '1.4a'
Likely reason: E.O. 13526 §1.4(a)
POC rank, full name, phone, email; QC rank, name, unit, phone, email
Likely reason: 3.5c, (b)(6) — personal privacy; (b)(3) 130b — personally identifying info of DoD personnel
Approver rank, name, contact info; INGEST POC info
Likely reason: 3.5c, (b)(3), 130b, (b)(6)
Aircraft callsign, asset type, tail number, takeoff/landing ICAO codes, times, total mission time, air-to-ground weapons
Likely reason: 1.4a (operations) and 1.4g (vulnerabilities/capabilities)
Time-on/off station DTGs, mission type, sensors available
Likely reason: 1.4g — vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems
ISR 2 timing, callsign, mission type, sensors; OPERATION name
Likely reason: 1.4a
UAP physical state, signatures, number of UAP, friendly aircraft altitude/speed, MDS type, RF frequency/duration, UAP event serial number
Likely reason: 1.4g — capabilities; 1.4a — operations
Standard USCENTCOM MISREP template (matches D74 and other D-series). Heavy 1.4a/1.4g redactions remove asset type, tail number, callsign, sensors, speeds, altitudes, operation names, and the full UAP description (only 'UAP HAD' survives). Observer was a TSGT/E-5 from 124 ATKS / 132 Wing, with QC at 432 AEW and approver at 379 AEW (609 CAOC). Incident at 140517ZJUL24, MGRS 38P MT 53 (Gulf of Aden region). Two ISR taskings in mission: NAVCENT (planned, ISR 1, where UAP was observed) and AFCENT (dynamic retasking, ISR 2). Released under USCENTCOM MDR 25-0072 on 2 June 2025; declassification date 2049-07-14.
No. The report does not identify it.
That is what the report says, but the published version gives no figures showing how much faster it was.
No. He judged that the object posed no threat.
Page 7
"First Coordinate: 38P MT 53 1.4a 17 1.4a"
Page 7
"Last Coordinate: 38P MT 22 1.4a 49 1.4a"
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"WEATHER WAS NOT A FACTOR"
Why it matters: Confirms observation conditions for ISR 1 were unimpaired.
Page 5
FMV (Full Motion Video)
sensor · Page 4
Observer name and contact; UAP velocity; UAP description (after 'UAP HAD'); UAP event description (Gentext)
Likely reason: 3.5c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6) — personnel privacy; 1.4a — operations
During a military mission over the Gulf of Aden, a crew member spotted an object in the air. He tracked it, but it receded until it was too far away to follow.
The report describes an object flying in a straight line at a steady altitude, faster than the aircraft. But it does not identify what was seen. The tracking ended not because the object suddenly disappeared, but because it had grown too distant.
The incident took place in July 2024, during a military mission over the Gulf of Aden. A crew member reported seeing a single object. The report classified it as unidentified: something observed but not identified.
The report describes the object’s path as straight and its altitude as constant. The crew member tracked it until it was too far away to follow. That was where the sighting ended, with no explanation of where the object went or what happened to it afterward.
According to the report, the object was traveling faster than the aircraft. However, the published version gives no figures that would allow the two speeds to be compared. The report says which one was faster, but not by how much.
The crew member judged that the object posed no threat. The report also lists its propulsion as unknown. These are separate details: the assessment that there was no danger does not explain what propelled the object.
The report describes one crew member’s sighting and does not identify the object. Nor does it provide a description that would make clear what the object looked like. What remains is an account of movement and distance, with no answer as to what was seen.
The report does not identify the object, explain what propelled it, or say whether anyone was controlling it. The published version offers no possible conventional explanation and no complete speed data with which to check the comparison to the aircraft.
Tracking stopped when the object grew too distant. The report leaves us with a straight line across the sky—and an object the crew member could not identify.