A military crew member saw it above the water. Then it vanished from the video feed.
A military crew member observed a small object over the Aegean Sea. He described sharp turns at an estimated speed of about 130 km/h, then lost it from the video feed.
USCENTCOM MISREP 9329374 from the 33 SOS (27 SOW, AFSOC) covering an ISR mission flown 26-27 October 2023 out of LGLR (Larissa, Greece) and recovering at OJMS (Amman, Jordan). The mission was tasked with FMV/SIGINT collection in support of a redacted GCP-VEO (violent extremist group) operation. At 0035Z on 27 October the aircrew observed a single UAP flying just above the ocean surface that performed multiple 90-degree turns at an estimated 80 MPH; contact was lost from the sensor feed at 0038Z. The event is classified as a UAP Incident with the observer assessing the object as benign and physical state solid; propulsion, advanced capabilities, and intelligent control are marked unknown.
While en route to its tasked target, the redacted callsign aircrew spotted a UAP flying just above the surface of the ocean water. The object made multiple sharp 90-degree turns at an estimated 80 MPH. Contact was lost from the FMV feed at 0038Z, three minutes after initial acquisition.
"AT 0035Z, [REDACTED] WAS EN ROUTE TO THEIR TARGET WHEN THEY SPOTTED A UAP FLYING JUST ABOVE THE SURFACE OF THE OCEAN WATER. THE UAP TOOK MULTIPLE 90 DEGREE TURNS AT AN ESTIMATED 80 MPH. AT 0038Z, [REDACTED] LOST THE UAP FROM THEIR FEED."
Speaker: Mission report GENTEXT/UAP
Why it matters: Core UAP narrative — establishes the sea-skimming behavior and 90-degree maneuvers cited in the public release description.
Page 7
"UAP Description (e.g., size, shape, color, markings, recognizable features): SEEMINGLY CIRCULAR, TOO SMALL TO MAKE OUT DETAILS"
Why it matters: Only morphological description provided by the observer.
Page 7
"UAP Maneuverability Observations: Sharp 90 degree turns"
Why it matters: Structured-field characterization of the object's kinematics.
Page 6
"Observer Assessment of UAP: Benign"
Why it matters: Crew's threat assessment of the object.
Page 6
"UAP Physical State: Solid"
Why it matters: Indicates a discrete material object rather than a transient/atmospheric return.
Page 6
"Kinetic Velocity: 80 MPH"
Why it matters: Estimated airspeed during the 90-degree turns.
Page 7
"Global Campaign Plan: GCP - VEO (violent extremist group)"
Why it matters: Frames the underlying mission as counter-VEO ISR — context for why a US asset was operating in this area.
Page 5
MG Richard A. Harrison
Declassification authority; USCENTCOM Chief of Staff · USCENTCOM · Page 1
LGLR (Larissa Air Base), Greece
Page 4
OJMS (Amman / Marka), Jordan
Page 4
First UAP coordinate 35S KD 951 [redacted] 5[redacted]
Page 7
Friendly aircraft location 35S KD 5[redacted]
Page 6
Tasked Start Point 36S YC 401 [redacted] 5[redacted]
Page 5
33 SOS
USAF (originator) · Page 2
27 SOW
USAF · Page 2
56 SOIS
USAF · Page 2
603rd AOC
USAF · Page 1
609 CAOC
USAF · Page 2
AN/DAS-4 (targeting pod)
sensor · Page 4
Aircraft callsign and operation name throughout narrative
Likely reason: 1.4(a) - military plans, weapons systems, operations
ATO and ATO Mission Number
Likely reason: 1.4(a)
POC, QC, and Approver names, phone numbers, and emails
Likely reason: 3.5(c), (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6) - personal privacy / unit identifying data
Aircraft callsign, asset type, MDS, tail numbers
Likely reason: 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
Tasked Start Point grid digits, Tasking/Request Number, Supported Unit and Operation
Likely reason: 1.4(a) / DATA MASKED
Friendly aircraft location, callsign, JTAC callsign, Killbox
Likely reason: 1.4(a)
First/Last UAP coordinate digits, friendly aircraft trajectory/altitude/speed, observer name
Likely reason: 1.4(a) and (b)(6)
Pair tightly with slug 051 (D35) — same Greek deployment, same unit (33 SOS / 27 SOW / AFSOC under USCENTCOM), same Aegean theater, very similar sea-skimming UAP narrative two days apart (27 Oct vs 29 Oct 2023). Both fall under USCENTCOM MDR 26-0019, declassified 22 Jan 2026 by MG Richard A. Harrison. Mission ostensibly counter-VEO ISR; takeoff LGLR (Greece), landing OJMS (Jordan) — a transit/relief sortie ('TRANSITED AND LANDING AT OJMS TO REPLACE THE LIGHTNING LINE THAT LANDED AT LGLR YESTERDAY', p.4). Total mission 13:30, FMV 6:29. The report's structured fields explicitly mark UAP Under Intelligent Control = NO, but Reaction to Observation = UNK and Advanced Capabilities = UNK — note the small internal tension between 'Benign' assessment, 'NO' intelligent control, and the observed 90-degree turns.
No. The report does not identify it.
No. The report provides the estimate but does not explain how it was calculated.
No reaction to the aircraft or harm was reported. The crew member assessed that the object was not dangerous.
AWGMESH (additional avionics)
sensor · Page 4
G-MESH
sensor · Page 5
Link 16
sensor · Page 4
FMV (primary sensor)
sensor · Page 4
A military crew member was en route to a destination over the Aegean Sea when he spotted a small object flying just above the water's surface.
The object made repeated sharp turns at an estimated speed of about 130 km/h. Then it disappeared from the video feed the crew was watching. The report describes what they saw but doesn't reveal what the object was or how it moved.
The object appeared round, according to the description recorded during the incident. It was too small for the crew member to discern any details. No additional signs or characteristics that might help identify it were provided.
The incident occurred during a military flight over the sea. The record describes the crew member on his way to a destination, then noticing the object over the ocean. It does not state how long he was able to see it.
According to the report, the object performed several 90-degree turns. This means that with each turn, it sharply changed direction rather than gradually curving. Its speed was estimated at about 130 km/h.
The crew did not report that the object reacted to their actions or attempted to approach them. Shortly after it was spotted, it disappeared from the video feed the crew was watching. The record does not describe a pursuit. The crew member assessed that the object was not dangerous, and no harm to people or equipment was reported.
It is unknown what the object was or what caused it to move in such a way. The report does not explain the basis for estimating its speed and turns, and emphasizes that the descriptions reflect the reporter's impression at the time of the incident.
The object vanished from the picture, but not from the question that remained: What exactly was flying over the water?