DIA Said Most AAWSAP Reports Drew on Public Information
In June 2009, Sen. Harry Reid asked to place parts of the contract under stricter classification. The agency found no grounds to do so.
All documents from AAWSAP’s first year remained unclassified, but not as a matter of principle. The contractor had no secure facility, and program employees were still undergoing background checks for security clearances.
The program was run by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from 2008 to 2012. Its official description says it defined 12 technical research areas focused on potential aerospace threats over a period of more than 40 years.
What the Senator Requested
Sen. Harry Reid asked to place parts of the contract in a Special Access Program (SAP), which protects information beyond the standard classification system and restricts access to a small group of people. In his letter, Reid called the program the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program and referred to “the identification of several highly sensitive and unusual aerospace-related findings” that required “extraordinary protection.” The document does not say what Reid had seen or explain what prompted him to write the letter.
The Agency’s Response
In a letter to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the DIA director wrote that there was no justification for establishing a Special Access Program. The information in the reports, he said, was not owned by or produced for the U.S. government, and much of it drew on publicly available scientific and technical information. He also wrote that classifying the entire program would be impractical and inadvisable, and that he saw no harm that might result from its disclosure.
In response to Reid’s remarks, the DIA said it knew of no report containing information sensitive enough to warrant additional protection. The agency said it believed Reid was referring to future stages of the program and to security and counterintelligence questions.
What Remains Unresolved
The document presents only the DIA’s position; it neither confirms nor rules out the existence of the findings Reid described. What is clear is that by November 2009, the DIA had not received a single report it considered sensitive enough to warrant additional classification. According to the document, draft versions of the first-year reports had been sent to the office and were expected to be released in the coming months.