He tried to track it as best he could. Even so, the crew couldn't identify what they saw.
A military mission report describes a crew member tracking an object flying north in Syrian airspace. He couldn't identify it, and the object's description was redacted.
USCENTCOM MISREP (Misrep undefined-7561279) covering a 20-hour 30-minute ISR sortie that took off from Sigonella Airbase (LICZ) on 29 May 2022 and landed at LICZ on 30 May 2022. The mission was tasked with target development and IMINT/SIGINT collection IVO 41EMD in the Eastern Mediterranean (operation area covering Syria, Lebanon, and Israel-Lebanon-Syria region), supporting 603 AOC under ATO E149. The aircraft was reacted to by 1-3 aircraft including 1x possible RFAF SU-30 at 2147Z, and at 0117Z one possible small UAP was observed flying north to northeast; the screener could not get a positive ID. Originator was 50 ATKS / 432 AEW; the document is classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY and was declassified by USCENTCOM Chief of Staff MG Richard A. Harrison on 8 October 2025.
One possible small UAP observed flying north to north-east; aircraft followed as long as possible. Screener could not get a positive ID. Friendly aircraft was at FL240, 142 KIAS. UAP signatures: No. Number sighted: 1.
Friendly aircraft was reacted to by 1-3 aircraft including 1x possible RFAF SU-30 that approached from the Syrian coast and got approximately 5NM from the friendly. The aircraft flew directly under friendly orbit (FL190 vs FL243) for approximately 2 minutes, then flew south for ~10NM and returned west. No impact to mission; friendly did not visually acquire the reported aircraft.
One probable SU-27/35 observed landing IVO 36SYE6[redacted] via FMV.
"AT 01172, ONE POSSIBLE SMALL UAP WAS OBSERVED. SEE UAP LINE 1."
Why it matters: Narrative-level entry of the UAP observation that triggers the UAP line of the MISREP.
Page 1
"(S//REL) [redacted] OBSERVED A UAP AT 0117Z FLY NORTH TO NORTH EAST AND FOLLOWED AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. SCREENER COULD NOT GET A POSITIVE ID ON THE UAP."
Why it matters: Verbatim UAP description (under GENTEXT/UAP) — the operator's qualitative account of the sighting.
Page 8
"(S//NF) AT 2147Z, [redacted] WAS REACTED TO BY 1-3 ACFT, INCLUDING IX POSS RFAF SU-30, THAT GOT APPROXIMATELY 5NM FROM [redacted]. THE ACFT APPROACHED WESTWARD FROM THE SYRIAN COAST, FLEW DIRECTLY UNDER [redacted] ORBIT (FL190, VS FL243) FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 MIN, FLEW SOUTH FOR ABOUT 10NM, AND THEN RETURNED WEST. THERE WAS NO IMPACT TO THE MISSION."
Why it matters: Documents a close approach by a possible Russian SU-30 to the U.S. ISR aircraft hours before the UAP sighting.
Page 8
"Number of UAP Sighted: 1 / UAP Signatures: No"
Why it matters: Sensor signatures field marked 'No' indicates no detected RF or signature from the UAP.
Page 8
MG Richard A. Harrison
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff (declassification authority) · USCENTCOM · Page 1
Sigonella Airbase (LICZ), Italy
Page 1
Operation Area 41EMD / Eastern Mediterranean
Page 1
Al Assad Airfield, Iraq
Page 1
Bassel Al Assad Intl Afld, Syria
Page 6
Tartus Naval Base, Syria
Page 6
Latakia (naval monitoring DSA), Syria
Page 6
Beirut (Army Bks Fakridine, military facility Karantina, possible terrorist CNO facility), Lebanon
Page 6
Juniyah Army Bks Sarba, Lebanon
Page 6
Rumyah Prison, Lebanon
Page 6
Bamlkah SIGINT Facility, Lebanon
Page 6
Ibn Hani Coastal Defense Site, Syria
Page 6
Jablah Naval Academy, Syria
Page 6
Al Ladhiqiyah Syrian Naval Headquarter
Page 6
50 ATKS (50th Attack Squadron)
Aircraft callsign and asset/MDS type throughout narrative timeline (1.4a markers)
Likely reason: 1.4a — military plans/weapons/operations
Operation name and ATO mission number
Likely reason: 1.4a — military plans/operations
POC Full Name, Phone Number, Email
Likely reason: FOIA Exemption (b)(3), (b)(6) — personal privacy; 3.5c
Aircraft callsign, asset type, tail number(s)
Likely reason: 1.4a, 1.4g — military plans / intelligence sources & methods
Tasked start point and JSR aircraft callsign (1.4c marker on Msn Type)
Likely reason: 1.4c — intelligence sources/methods
MGRS-style coordinate fragments redacted across ~40 collection targets (Syrian Navy ops areas, OPIR DSA, Latakia naval monitoring DSA, Bassel Al Assad airfield, Tartus, etc.)
Likely reason: 1.4a — operational details
MDS Type / Asset Type and Tail Number on UAP report; UAP first seen location (37SBV28[redacted])
Likely reason: 1.4a, 1.4g — platform identity / collection methods
Aircraft callsign and observed activity location coordinates (36SYE6[redacted])
Likely reason: 1.4a — operational details
Standard USCENTCOM MISREP (Misrep undefined-7561279), originator 50 ATKS / 432 AEW, ATO E149, takeoff Sigonella 291355Z MAY22, land 301025Z MAY22 (20h30m total). Sensor suite (ANDAS4 targeting pod, AH/SAR, AIRHANDLER SIGINT) and 20+ hour endurance are consistent with an MQ-9 Reaper ISR profile, though the asset type is redacted (1.4a, 1.4g). UAP entry is in the structured UAP section (page 8) — a single 'possible small UAP' with no signatures detected, no positive ID. Useful for cross-referencing other 50 ATKS / 432 AEW MISREPs and any AARO summary indices.
On May 30, 2022, according to the reporting time in the report.
It's impossible to know from the published text. The description itself is not visible.
No. The crew member tracked it but couldn't identify it.
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
432 AEW (432nd Air Expeditionary Wing)
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
603 AOC (603rd Air Operations Center)
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
609 CAOC
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
12 AF PAROC
U.S. Air Force · Page 3
DGS-IN / DGS-4 (Distributed Ground System exploitation)
U.S. Air Force · Page 1
ANDAS4 targeting pod
sensor · Page 4
AH/SAR (additional avionics)
sensor · Page 4
AIRHANDLER (SIGINT collection)
sensor · Page 1
FMV (Full Motion Video)
sensor · Page 9
SU-30 (possible RFAF)
aircraft · Page 8
SU-27/35 (probable, observed landing/takeoff)
aircraft · Page 6
A-50U Mainstay D
aircraft · Page 6
IL-38
aircraft · Page 6
IL-76 (probable)
aircraft · Page 6
Slava-class CG (hull 055)
ship · Page 6
Gorshkov-class FFG (hull 461)
ship · Page 6
Udaloy I DD (hulls 626, 564)
ship · Page 6
During a military mission in Syrian airspace, a crew member observed an object flying north. He tracked it as best he could but couldn't identify it.
The incident appears in a United States Army mission report. The report documents a tracking attempt that continued until the crew lost the ability to identify the object — but it conceals the detail that might have helped understand what the crew member saw.
According to the report, the object moved north-northeast. The crew member continued to track it as best he could. Despite this, the crew could not definitively identify it.
The report contains no visible description of what the object looked like. Therefore, the direction and tracking alone are not enough to understand what was in the sky. Only the basic picture remains: a single object, flying north, and a crew member trying to track it.
The document is a military mission report, intended to document the course of operations. According to the record, the flight began on May 29, 2022, and the incident was reported the following day, in Syrian airspace.
Within the report, there is a section dedicated to the object. But where its description should appear, redacted sections are found. So the question of what exactly was written there remains unanswered: the original text is not visible in the published document.
The report does state that the crew member tracked the object as best he could and that he couldn't identify it. This is little information, but it describes a specific moment: an attempt to track something in the sky without achieving identification.
It is unknown what the object was, and the report offers no conventional explanation for what was observed. The description was redacted, and the record emphasizes that these details reflect the reporter's impression at the time of the incident — not a definitive statement about the object's characteristics.
The direction remains written in the report. The description itself remains behind the redaction.