Military Crew Member Reports Sighting at 550 Meters
Filed during a flight over the Strait of Hormuz, the report gives an estimated altitude but no description of what was seen.
Filed during a flight over the Strait of Hormuz, the report gives an estimated altitude but no description of what was seen.
During a surveillance flight over the Strait of Hormuz, a military crew member reported seeing an unidentified phenomenon in camera footage. The report estimated its altitude at about 550 meters but gave no description of its appearance or movement.
USCENTCOM MISREP 4782130 (MOR 26-0019) documenting a 20.9-hour AREC (armed reconnaissance) ISR mission flown 15-16 September 2020 by 482ATKS / 432 AEW out of OKAS in support of NAVCENT, covering the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. The aircraft collected SIGINT via AIRHANDLER and FMV (exploited by DGS), received three guard calls from Iranian Air Defense, suffered two complete-impact lost-link EMI events of unknown type, and at 1732Z on 16 September 2020 observed a UAP IVO MGRS 39RVM5 while at FL180 / 90 KIAS, recorded via FMV. Declassified by MG Richard A. Harrison, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, on 22 January 2026.
Aircraft observed a UAP via FMV while on station; reported under OBS Line 1 of the MISREP. Aircraft was at FL180, 90 KIAS at time of observation.
Aircraft hailed on GUARD frequency by Iranian Air Defense (Guard Call Line 1); standard orders given, standard response made; no impact to mission.
Aircraft hailed on GUARD frequency by Iranian Air Defense (Guard Call Line 2); standard orders given and standard response; no impact to mission.
Aircraft hailed on GUARD 243.000 frequency by Iranian Air Defense (Guard Call Line 3); tone PROFESSIONAL; standard response.
Lost link of unknown EMI type for 11 minutes; complete impact to system; flight path deviation required; medium mission impact. Reported under JSIR ID330412.
Lost link of unknown EMI type for 27 minutes; complete impact to system; flight path deviation required; medium mission impact. Reported under JSIR ID330414.
Aircraft observed an IR-1t-5 launcher in the vicinity of Abu Musa Island during ISR scan of Iranian/IRGCN vessel target deck.
Aircraft observed 2x possible Houdong-class fast attack craft (WPTG) docked pierside.
"AT 1732Z, [REDACTED] OBSERVED A UAP. SEE OBS LINE 1."
Why it matters: Narrative-section flag of the UAP observation event.
Page 1
"AT 1732Z, [REDACTED] OBSERVED A UAP IVO 39RVM5"
Why it matters: OBS Line 1 establishes the UAP location at MGRS grid 39RVM5 in the Strait of Hormuz / Arabian Gulf area.
Page 8
"Observed Activity Description: UAP / Method of Observation: FMV"
Why it matters: Confirms the observation was captured on Full Motion Video, later exploited by DGS.
Page 8
"AT 1248Z, [REDACTED] EXPERIENCED LOST LINK ... DUE TO POSSIBLE [1.4g REDACTION] ... REGAINED LINK AT 1259Z. THIS RESULTED IN A MEDIUM IMPACT TO THE MISSION JSIR ID330412"
Why it matters: First of two unexplained lost-link EMI events; suspected cause is redacted under E.O. exemption 1.4(g) (vulnerabilities).
Page 7
"AT 1414Z, [REDACTED] EXPERIENCED LOST LINK TO POSSIBLE [1.4g REDACTION] ... REGAINED 1441Z. THIS RESULTED IN A MEDIUM IMPACT TO THE MISSION JSIR ID330414"
Why it matters: Second EMI/lost-link event approximately 3 hours before the UAP observation.
Page 8
"TO CHARACTERIZE IRIN/IRGCN VESSELS, UAS ACTIVITY, ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF PORTS, AND TO ESTABLISH PATTERN OF LIFE."
Why it matters: States the mission objective in support of NAVCENT — including UAS (unmanned aerial systems) activity characterization.
Page 5
"FMV WAS EXPLOITED BY DGS. 20.9 MISSION HOURS. 15.2 IMINT HOURS ... 19.3 SIGINT HOURS"
MG Richard A. Harrison
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff (declassification authority) · USCENTCOM · Page 1
OKAS (takeoff/landing ICAO), Kuwait
Page 4
Arabian Gulf
Page 1
Strait of Hormuz
Page 1
Gulf of Oman
Page 1
Abu Musa Island, Iran (disputed)
Page 5
MGRS 40RCP (guard-call locations)
Page 6
MGRS 39RXK0 (EMI Line 1 location)
Page 7
MGRS 39RVM9 (EMI Line 2 location)
Page 8
MGRS 39RVM5 (UAP observation location)
Page 8
482ATKS
U.S. Air Force · Page 1
432 AEW
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
609 CAOC / 609th AOC
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
12 AF, Det 3, PAROC
U.S. Air Force · Page 2
NAVCENT
U.S. Navy · Page 5
USCENTCOM
Narrative repeatedly redacts aircraft callsign and operation name; many time-stamped events show callsign blanked.
Likely reason: 1.4(a) — military plans, weapons systems, or operations
Operation name redacted (NAVCENT operation aircraft was supporting).
Likely reason: 1.4(a)
Asset Type (Aircraft) and Aircraft Tail Number(s) redacted.
Likely reason: 1.4(a) and 1.4(g) — vulnerabilities/capabilities
Air-to-Ground Wpn loadout redacted.
Likely reason: 1.4(a)
EMI Line 1: 'DUE TO POSSIBLE [redacted]' — suspected cause of lost link.
Likely reason: 1.4(g) — vulnerabilities/capabilities of systems
EMI Line 2: 'POSSIBLE [redacted]' — suspected cause of lost link.
Likely reason: 1.4(g)
Affected System and Frequency Affected fields blanked under 1.4(g).
Likely reason: 1.4(g)
POC names, phone numbers, and emails redacted.
Likely reason: 3.5(c) and (b)(3)/130b/(b)(6) — personally identifiable information
Aircraft callsign and aircraft heading at observation moment redacted.
MISREP follows USCENTCOM standard format. The narrative on page 1 enumerates events in chronological order; structured sections (GUARDCALL, EMI, OBSERVATION) on later pages contain the per-event detail. The UAP observation is recorded under 'Observed Activity Description: UAP, Method of Observation: FMV' on page 8 — locate at MGRS 39RVM5, FL180, 90 KIAS. Aircraft heading at observation is redacted; range and bearing fields are blank in the form. Two EMI events of UNKNOWN type same day are temporally proximate to the UAP and worth correlating against companion document 071 (October 2020 Strait of Hormuz MISREP). Manifest description supplies the '1,800 feet' altitude estimate not present in the unredacted text body. JSIR IDs 330412 and 330414 are pivot points to additional joint spectrum interference reports.
The report does not describe its appearance. It only notes an unidentified phenomenon seen in camera footage.
It is a US military mission record, released to the public by the Department of War.
Why it matters: Mission summary metrics.
Page 1
"Declassified by MG Richard A. Harrison, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, Declassified on: 22 January 2026"
Why it matters: Declassification provenance.
Page 1
DoD Combatant Command · Page 1
ACC
U.S. Air Force (MAJCOM) · Page 1
DGS (Distributed Ground System)
U.S. Air Force · Page 1
Iranian Air Defense
Iran (IRIN/IRGCN context) · Page 6
ANDAS4
sensor (targeting pod / primary sensor) · Page 3
AH_GMESH / AHGMESH
sensor (additional avionics) · Page 3
AIRHANDLER
sensor (SIGINT collection system) · Page 1
Likely reason: 1.4(a)
During a surveillance flight over the Strait of Hormuz, a military crew member reviewed camera footage and reported seeing an unidentified phenomenon: something visible, but not identified.
The report estimated that the phenomenon was about half a kilometer above the ground. But the field meant to describe what was seen is blank. The form offers only a brief account of the sighting and how it was made. So what can we actually learn from this document?
The incident took place on September 16, 2020, during a US Air Force surveillance mission. The aircraft was operating near the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway off Iran. The sighting was recorded at 17:32 Coordinated Universal Time, the time standard used in military reports.
The form identifies the person who filed the report as an “operator,” a service member with a role in the mission. According to the record, the operator viewed the phenomenon in camera footage. The form lists one sighting and does not say whether anyone else saw it.
The report gives an estimated altitude of about 550 meters. That is a concrete detail, but it does not tell us whether the object appeared large or small, bright or dark. There is no information about its shape or movement, either.
The gap is apparent in the form itself. One line records what was observed; another says how it was observed. The field for additional details about the sighting is blank. In other words, the document records that a crew member saw something but preserves no description that would help readers picture it.
This is a military mission report, a type of form the US military uses to document its operations. The Department of War released the record to the public. Some portions are redacted, but they are not needed to understand what the report says about the sighting: one line records it, with no further details.
The report does not explain what the phenomenon was, what it looked like, or what happened to it afterward. It offers no conventional explanation and contains no details that would establish that it was an aircraft.
What remains is a brief record of something seen in the sky. What the report leaves out remains beyond view.