CIA Director Called for Talks on Using Flying Saucers in Psychological Warfare
A draft memo dated October 1952, addressed to the Psychological Strategy Board, proposed examining offensive and defensive uses of the phenomenon.
A 1952 CIA memo proposed examining how reports of flying saucers might be used in psychological warfare. The document acknowledged that the agency had no basis for ruling out the phenomenon and said there was not enough information about its nature.
In an internal CIA memo that remained a draft and was dated early October 1952, agency director Walter B. Smith called for a discussion of reports of flying saucers. The document itself offers no evidence that it was sent in this form.
The memo was addressed to the director of the Psychological Strategy Board, the body that coordinated the U.S. government’s psychological warfare efforts. Smith called for an early discussion of ways to exploit the phenomenon for offensive or defensive purposes. Attached was a proposal to be sent to the National Security Council, the body that advises the president on national security. The proposal said the problem of unidentified objects had implications for psychological warfare, intelligence, and operations.
1,500 Reports, One Method
Since 1947, the government had received about 1,500 official reports, along with letters, phone calls, and press coverage. The Air Force considered about 20 percent of the official reports unexplained, and the share was even higher among reports received in 1952. A small unit handled the investigation, examining each case individually and trying to explain it. The memo calls this a reasonable approach, but says it does not help explain the phenomenon in depth.
No Information on Soviet Research
Advisers from MIT told the Air Force that the explanation might lie beyond the limits of scientific knowledge at the time, and that nuclear waste could be a factor worth considering. The memo also notes that no reports on the subject had appeared in the Soviet press and that the agency had no information about what the Soviets knew or planned.
The document presents no evidence about the nature of the reports. It proposes a research program led by the Research and Development Board to examine operational, intelligence, and psychological needs. Without such research, the memo says, it would be impossible to know whether the phenomenon could be controlled or predicted.
The memo states that the agency had no basis for ruling out the phenomenon’s existence and warns that the Soviet Union might exploit it.